

Key Management in Ad-Hoc Networks

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- Key management approaches
- Authenticated key agreement methods
- Case: WLAN

Key Management Approaches

- 1 Key predistribution
- 2 Key transport
- 3 Key arbitration
- 4 Key agreement

Now let's take a closer look at these

Key Management Approaches (2)

- Key Predistribution
 - Key distributed to all parties before communication
 - Static: Not possible to add devices
- Key Transport
 - One device generates a key, and transmits it to all receivers
 - The simplest scheme: Predistributed key is used to encrypt the session key. Also PKI is possible
 - Shamir's three-pass protocol (See next slide)

Shamir's three-pass protocol

- 1 D_1 generates random key K and encrypts it using f with random key x and sends the value to D_2

$$D_1 \rightarrow D_2: f_x(K)$$

- 2 D_2 encrypts the received message using g and a random key y and sends the value to D_1

$$D_1 \leftarrow D_2: g_y(f_x(K))$$

- 3 D_1 decrypts the received value using f^{-1} and x and sends the value to D_2

$$D_1 \rightarrow D_2:$$


$$f^{-1}(g_y(f_x(K))) = f_x^{-1}(f_x(g_y(K))) = g_y(K)$$

- 4 D_2 decrypts the received value using g^{-1} and y .


Key Management Approaches (3)

- Key Arbitration
 - Central arbitrator creates and distributes the keys
 - For example AP
 - The arbitrator need to be accessible by all the devices all the time
- Key Agreement
 - For example Diffie-Hellman Key agreement protocol
 - A passive attacker does not get the key, active man-in-the-middle is a threat
 - Needs quite a lot of computational power

Recap: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange




Another Classification



Key Management

- Authentication is crucial aspect
- Diffie-Hellman key negotiation is vulnerable to active man-in-the-middle attacks



Encrypted Key Exchange

- 1 D_1 picks fresh random number a , and sends $(1, P(g^a \text{ mod } p))$ to D_2
- 2 D_2 picks fresh random number b , computes the shared secret $K = g^{ab} \text{ mod } p$, and sends $(P(g^b \text{ mod } p), K(\text{challenge}_2))$ to D_1
- 3 D_1 computes the shared secret $K = g^{ab} \text{ mod } p$, and sends $K(\text{challenge}_1, \text{challenge}_2)$ to D_2
- 4 D_2 verifies, that challenge_2 was echoed correctly and sends $K(\text{challenge}_1)$ to D_1 .
- 5 D_1 verifies, that challenge_1 was echoed correctly

Encrypted Key Exchange for Groups

- 1 $D_i \rightarrow D_{i+1} : g^{R_1 R_2 \dots R_i} \pmod p, i = 1, \dots, n - 2$
- 2 $D_{n-1} \rightarrow \text{ALL} : \pi = g^{R_1 R_2 \dots R_{n-1}} \pmod p$
- 3 $D_i \rightarrow D_n : P(c_i), i = 1, \dots, n - 1$, where $c_i = \pi^{\frac{\tilde{R}_i}{R_i}}$ and \tilde{R}_i is a fresh random number generated by D_i
- 4 $D_n \rightarrow D_i : c_i^{R_n}, i = 1, \dots, n - 1$
- 5 $D_i \rightarrow \text{ALL} : D_i, K(D_i, H(D_1, D_2, \dots, D_n))$ for some i

Numeric Comparison: MANA IV

- Devices authenticate public Diffie-Hellman keys
- The users are expected to compare verification strings

1 $D_1 \rightarrow D_2: h(R_1)$

2 $D_1 \leftarrow D_2: R_2$

3 $D_1 \rightarrow D_2: R_1$

4 D_2 checks if $\hat{h} \stackrel{?}{=} h(\hat{R}_1)$ If equality holds, D_2 computes $v_2 = f(P\hat{K}_1, PK_2, \hat{R}_1, R_2)$, otherwise it aborts .

D_1 computes $v_1 = f(PK_1, P\hat{K}_2, R_1, \hat{R}_2)$.


5 Both devices check if v_1 equals v_2 .

Threshold Cryptography

- Relies on trusted third parties
- $t + 1$ out of n servers needed to sign a certificate (where $n \geq 3t + 1$)
- Signing a certificate:
 - Each server generates a partial signature
 - The partial signatures are sent to a combiner
 - The combiner generates the signature out of $t + 1$ partial signatures and verifies it
 - If verification fails, at least one partial signature was not valid
 - New set of $t + 1$ partial signatures is tried

- Devices first negotiate upper layer keys (for example Simple Config)
- The upper layer keys are used on MAC-layer to negotiate keys
- A Group Temporal Key (GTK) is derived
 - Sender specific

Multicast: WLAN



Conclusions

- Key management is crucial aspect
- Multiple different ways to handle key negotiation
- Not enough to just negotiate key, but lower level protocols need to be taken into consideration also

Thank You!

Questions?