

**T-79.159 Cryptography and Data Security  
Home Assignment 1**

**Spring 2003**

To be returned (on paper, preferably written using a computer) to the box next to room B336 in the 3rd floor of the T building.

Revised deadline: March 10, 2003 at 12:00hrs.

Remember to write down:

- The code and name of the course.
- Your full name.
- Student number.

You must solve 4 problems to pass and to be able to go to the exam; solving all 5 adds 15% to your exam points. Please try to make the answers as full and complete as possible.

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**Answer at least four of the five questions below.**

1. We shall use the following model for computational cost of breaking a cipher with a 64-bit key:
  - A year 2003 computer node that costs 1000 EUR can test  $10^7$  keys per second.
  - Moore's "law" will continue to hold; the amount of computing power that can be purchased with 1000 EUR will double every 18 months (exponential growth).
  - Significant advances in theoretical cryptanalysis will not occur.

Estimate the time required to break the key (on average case) by the following groups:

- a) National Security Agency (<http://www.nsa.gov>). 5 000 000 000 EUR annual budget for hardware.
  - b) CSC Oy (<http://www.csc.fi>), 5 000 000 EUR annual budget for hardware.
  - c) HUT Krypto Group (<http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Research/Crypto/>). 5 000 EUR annual budget for hardware.
2. Counter mode (CTR) essentially turns a block cipher into a stream cipher (keystream generator). We shall use a zero IV (initial value):

Encryption:

$$\begin{aligned}E_K(0) \oplus P_0 &= C_0 \\E_K(1) \oplus P_1 &= C_1 \\&\dots \\E_K(n) \oplus P_n &= C_n\end{aligned}$$

Decryption:

$$\begin{aligned}E_K(0) \oplus C_0 &= P_0 \\E_K(1) \oplus C_1 &= P_1 \\&\dots \\E_K(n) \oplus C_n &= P_n\end{aligned}$$

Here  $K$  is the secret key,  $P_i$  is the plaintext block and  $C_i$  is the corresponding ciphertext block.

$2^{40}$  bits of keystream is available. Is there any way of distinguishing the keystream from a random sequence without an exhaustive key search ?

- Count the number of different 8-bit block ciphers with a 8-bit key.

Definition. An  $n$ -bit *block cipher* is a function  $E : V_n \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow V_n$ , such that for each key  $K \in \mathcal{K}$ ,  $E(K, P)$  is an invertible mapping (the *encryption function* for  $\mathcal{K}$ ) from  $V_n$  to  $V_n$ , written  $E_K(P)$ . The inverse mapping is the *decryption function*, denoted  $D_K(C)$ .  $C = E_K(P)$  denotes that ciphertext  $C$  results from encrypting plaintext  $P$  under  $K$ .<sup>1</sup>

Hints: Count ALL variants, good and bad – even identity transform is included. In this case the key space size is  $|\mathcal{K}| = 2^8$ . It might be helpful to think about how much memory would be required to store a general block cipher as a table.

- Given an RSA public modulus  $n = p \cdot q$ , public exponent  $e$  and the private exponent  $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ , find factors  $p$  and  $q$ .

$$\begin{aligned}n &= 658376639252498583254140508085539188031 \\e &= 17 \\d &= 154912150412352607810683732878343115217\end{aligned}$$

Testing the variables for correctness (example):

$$\begin{aligned}123456789^e &= 627333577232488045926157258337023432524 \pmod{n} \\627333577232488045926157258337023432524^d &= 123456789 \pmod{n}\end{aligned}$$

Try to find an algebraic solution to the problem that utilizes the knowledge of the private (“secret”) parameter  $d$  and that is faster than direct factorization of  $n$ .

Hints: Mathematica and Maple directly support computations on large integers, as do certain programming languages (e.g. BC, Java and Python). Support for C and C++ can be added using the GNU Multiprecision library <http://swox.com/gmp/>.

- Find a collision for for the first 48 bits (six bytes) of the SHA-1 hash function output. Include a detailed description of the method that you used (with source code if possible).

Example (using hexadecimal notation):

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<sup>1</sup>Adopted from Definition 7.1 (p. 224) in Menezes et al, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press 1996.

SHA1(77 28 CC 1E 73 0A) =  
51 D2 E8 D0 79 11 46 54 A6 00 A7 44 36 2F 17 97 FF E9 93 A9

SHA1(13 DA FC 00 E4 36) =  
51 D2 E8 D0 79 11 D8 A8 46 FE 04 79 30 48 A0 6E 50 84 74 FF

Since the first 48 bits of the 160-bit message digest are the same (51 D2 E8 D0 79 11), this is a collision in the sense that is required by the exercise. Note that collision search will take a long time unless you use a  $O(\sqrt{n})$  algorithm.

Hints: A reasonable C-language implementation of a collision finding algorithm runs for about one minute on a 1.4 GHz Athlon; Java implementation running on a slow computer may require several hours! Test your algorithm on a smaller problem first (e.g. 32 bits).

More information regarding SHA-1 is available from:

- Official specification of SHA-1:  
<http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm>
- RFC 3174 contains an implementation of SHA-1:  
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3174.txt?number=3174>
- The OpenSSL library contains an implementation as well:  
<http://www.openssl.org>